[ Threat Log ]
[ Critical & High ]
1 finding- ✓ RemediatedVIB-01High
Frozen refund denominator included non-redeemable AMM / project-token balances
[ High / Medium ]
3 findings- ✓ RemediatedVIB-02High / Medium
Operations admin could manipulate the frozen refund denominator via mutable custody-address setters
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-03High / Medium
Deployment completeness was not fail-closed and could silently strand staker rewards
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-04High / Medium
Historical staker rewards could become permanently unclaimable after a full unstake
[ Medium ]
4 findings- ✓ RemediatedVIB-05Medium
Staking snapshot backfill could make long-lived stakers unable to unstake
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-07Medium
Public registry registration could squat predicted factory token addresses
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-08Medium
A weak or collusive challenge could consume the only tranche challenge slot
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-09Medium
Manual LP recovery proof could accept non-canonical pools or withdrawable claimers
[ Low ]
3 findings- ✓ RemediatedVIB-06Medium / Low
Staker rewards could be stranded by same-block eligibility mismatch or floor rounding
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-10Low / Medium
Community rewards batch totals were not enforced at claim time
- ✓ RemediatedVIB-11Low / Medium
Accrued platform fees could become unreachable after freeze / refund